(This is part 3 of series on the Problem of Evil)
The next Theodicy is The Bigger Picture Theodicy. If an individual had the means, the motive, and the opportunity to prevent some horrible crime (say murder or a rape), we normally think that person is open to moral criticism for failing to intervene. Similarly, the claim is that God is open to moral criticism as well for failing to intervene. This Theodicy claims that God’s greater knowledge allows him to know that he shouldn’t interfere in cases that we would normally think a person should interfere. Given our limited, finite knowledge, we don't see the bigger picture and think God should have interfered. God, however, sees the bigger picture and recognizes that he should not interfere because his interference would do more harm than good. In this way, God is doing the right thing in letting the evil occur.
For example, in the movie Spiderman, Peter Parker could have interfered to prevent an armed robber from getting away. He didn't act as a kind of revenge on the wrestling match organizer. The robber then ends up killing Parker's uncle. Had Parker known the bigger picture, he would have stopped the armed robber when he had the chance. Similarly, when we criticize God for not acting to prevent an evil, we are like Parker. We don't have the wider context of knowledge that justifies God's non-interference.
This Theodicy suffers from some similar problems to the previous two(Greater Good and Higher Morality).
First, it fails the Holocaust test. What greater context of knowledge justifies non-interference in such a case? For example, if we are Parker and see the armed robber running down the hall, it is not too hard for us to imagine a scenario that calls for our interference. But what scenario justifies non-interference in the murder of 6 million? One scenario that is sometimes offered is that possibly if God had interfered that would have eventually lead to the deaths of millions more in some other context. But this calls into question God's omnipotence. With infinite power, he should be able to prevent both catastrophes. It also raises the problem of whether lives are interchangeable. That is, is it morally justified to let 1 die to prevent the death of 2(or 2 million)? Most Utilitarians would answer yes, but it's not clear that doing so is justifiable outside of utilitarianism.
Second, we are left in the same obscure position as with Divine Purpose: we don't have access to the Divine Purpose or to the Bigger Picture. Thus, we have no way to evaluate whether the non-interference is justified on the basis of these. For example, to badly paraphrase Hume, maybe the bigger picture available to God is that to have interfered in the Holocaust would have scratched his finger. Surely, if that is the case, God is not all-good. Thus, to be able to justify this Theodicy we need to know the bigger picture as well. But since we don't have access, the Theodicy is ultimately incomprehensible, thus failing to provide a resolution to the paradox.