Problem of Evil: Soul-Making

(#4 in the Problem of Evil Series)

The soul-making theodicy rests on the idea that God allows evil to exist because the existence of evil is a necessary condition for individuals to develop or complete their moral souls.

We need to learn what morality is about and we need to develop the proper virtues. We cannot learn these in a vacuum nor do we know morality a priori. The suffering of others is, the theodicy argues, essential for individuals to learn these lessons about morality and virtue. Without the opportunities offered by suffering and evil, individuals would not have the chance to develop or demonstrate moral virtues, like compassion or courage.

The theodicy can be summarized as follows:

• A world of moral individuals is a good thing.
• Individuals have to learn how to be moral.
• Suffering and evil are necessary in order to learn how to be moral.
• God desires to create a world of moral individuals.
• God must therefore allow suffering and evil in order to bring about the good of a world of moral individuals.

There are a number of problems with this theodicy.

The main problem comes in the third proposition above: that suffering and evil are necessary in order to learn how to be moral. Surely this is not true of all moral virtues or concepts. The virtue of independence is not developed as a response to suffering: it’s developed out of a need for relying on one’s own judgment and action. One might also consider the amount of non-human suffering that exists and what connection this serves for the development of moral character.

Also, there is plenty of suffering and evil that does not seem to teach us any unique lessons. Showing compassion can be praiseworthy; but surely we can learn this without two-year olds dying from cancer or tornados ripping through towns every summer. And just what did we learn from the Holocaust that we didn’t know already? We didn’t know that mass murder was evil and needed the Nazi’s reign of terror to learn this?

One might argue, well supported by the evidence of post-Holocaust genocides, that mankind has not taken this lesson to heart. But this also undermines the theodicy. God’s goal, ex hypothesis, is to create moral individuals and he allows evil to allow us to learn the moral lessons we are supposed to learn. But if this is not working, then shouldn’t the tactics change? And so wouldn’t God’s failing to change tactics be a kind of moral failure? If a parent decides to beat his children to teach them how to behave properly, and comes to see that this doesn’t work, but continues to beat his children, then we would conclude that the parent is engaging in evil. And, moreover, even if the tactic did work, we still should not tolerate this in the parent. There are more humane ways to teach children how to behave properly.

So, suffering and evil are not necessary conditions for moral development. We can learn morality without being subjected to evil. Moreover, intentionally subjecting one to evil in order to teach them a lesson seems monstrous. There are other ways to teach the lesson and such lessons often don’t work any way.

Another important problem with this theodicy is that it makes a fetish out of suffering. If morality depends on the existence of suffering, then if there was no suffering, we would have to create suffering just to have morality. This strikes me as perverse. Suffering should not be a moral primary; it is secondary to the primary concern of morality: learning how to best live one’s life.

This also leads to a new paradox. The idea here is that morality needs suffering to develop virtues like compassion. But if there was no suffering in the world, would we need the virtue of compassion? It seems like the virtues that are most likely to be pointed to as being developed in response to evils are the virtues that are only needed because there are evils in the world. This undermines the theodicy because if God didn’t allow the evil in the first place, we wouldn’t need those virtues and so we would have no need to learn them by experiencing evil.

One common response to this is that these virtues are needed for the next world, for heaven, or for some deeper relationship with God. A problem with this move is that this is wholly arbitrary speculation. How can anyone know this? One could just as easily argue that one cannot get into heaven without being able to play badminton. And even one could know this, it doesn’t justify the evil. Consider again the parent who beats his children to teach them to behave. The fact that his goal is a good thing doesn’t justify his means. One should wonder about the justice of God if he creates the world in such a way that the only way to get to his kingdom is to have to learn virtues that rely on experiencing evil.

The Bigger Picture (Problem of Evil #3)

(This is part 3 of series on the Problem of Evil)

The next Theodicy is The Bigger Picture Theodicy. If an individual had the means, the motive, and the opportunity to prevent some horrible crime (say murder or a rape), we normally think that person is open to moral criticism for failing to intervene. Similarly, the claim is that God is open to moral criticism as well for failing to intervene. This Theodicy claims that God’s greater knowledge allows him to know that he shouldn’t interfere in cases that we would normally think a person should interfere. Given our limited, finite knowledge, we don't see the bigger picture and think God should have interfered. God, however, sees the bigger picture and recognizes that he should not interfere because his interference would do more harm than good. In this way, God is doing the right thing in letting the evil occur.

For example, in the movie Spiderman, Peter Parker could have interfered to prevent an armed robber from getting away. He didn't act as a kind of revenge on the wrestling match organizer. The robber then ends up killing Parker's uncle. Had Parker known the bigger picture, he would have stopped the armed robber when he had the chance. Similarly, when we criticize God for not acting to prevent an evil, we are like Parker. We don't have the wider context of knowledge that justifies God's non-interference.

This Theodicy suffers from some similar problems to the previous two(Greater Good and Higher Morality).

First, it fails the Holocaust test. What greater context of knowledge justifies non-interference in such a case? For example, if we are Parker and see the armed robber running down the hall, it is not too hard for us to imagine a scenario that calls for our interference. But what scenario justifies non-interference in the murder of 6 million? One scenario that is sometimes offered is that possibly if God had interfered that would have eventually lead to the deaths of millions more in some other context. But this calls into question God's omnipotence. With infinite power, he should be able to prevent both catastrophes. It also raises the problem of whether lives are interchangeable. That is, is it morally justified to let 1 die to prevent the death of 2(or 2 million)? Most Utilitarians would answer yes, but it's not clear that doing so is justifiable outside of utilitarianism.

Second, we are left in the same obscure position as with Divine Purpose: we don't have access to the Divine Purpose or to the Bigger Picture. Thus, we have no way to evaluate whether the non-interference is justified on the basis of these. For example, to badly paraphrase Hume, maybe the bigger picture available to God is that to have interfered in the Holocaust would have scratched his finger. Surely, if that is the case, God is not all-good. Thus, to be able to justify this Theodicy we need to know the bigger picture as well. But since we don't have access, the Theodicy is ultimately incomprehensible, thus failing to provide a resolution to the paradox.

Higher Morality (Problem of Evil #2)

(This is part 2 of series on the Problem of Evil)

The essential idea with this Theodicy is that God should be judged by some higher, divine morality. From the perspective of this higher morality, what is described or characterized as evil by human morality is actually good.

Like the The Greater Good Theodicy, this Theodicy ends up denying the existence of evil. What we take to be evil is really good. And so it fails the basic test of maintaining all four claims of the paradox (see the original post).

Another problem here is that it sets human morality at odds with the higher divine morality. If the higher morality is going to judge the Holocaust, fatal disease outbreaks, etc, as good, while human morality will judge them bad, then the 'good' in each of these moralities are different. Good on the higher morality is not what we mean by good.

But, then, which good is being ascribed when we say God is all-good? If it is the human morality usage, then we appear to be right back with the paradox. If it is the divine morality usage, then maybe we resolve the paradox but at the cost of understanding. We don't know what divine morality means by good if it would describe the Holocaust as good. Moreover, we have no access to what divine morality is. So, we do not understand what all-good means.

Some theists will accept this. God is obscure (as Patrick mentioned in one of the comments to an earlier post). But if we are aiming to get an understanding of the problem of evil and get to some comprehensible resolution, then this is not an answer. The only reason to engage in Theodicy is because one is uncomfortable with paradox presented by the problem of evil. If one is satisfied with obscurity, I doubt the paradox would be all that disquieting in the first place.

The central problem, then, with this Theodicy is that it makes 'good' incomprehensible, and so the whole Theodicy is incomprehensible.

Greater Good (Problem of Evil #1)

Welcome back to my series analyzing the problem of evil (See the opening post). The first Theodicy is: "The Greater Good".

According to this Theodicy, God is not evil because the suffering and injustice in the world serve some greater good. A dentist who has to pull a patient's infected tooth causes pain and suffering, but since this is done for the greater good, it is not an evil act. Similarly, God causes the pain and suffering in the world but these serve some greater good and so it doesn't count as evil.

One problem with this Theodicy is that it actually doesn't resolve the paradox. It denies the fourth claim that evil exists by making what appears to be evil into a means to the end of some greater good. Evil is transformed into an instrumental good.

But even ignoring this problem, this Theodicy doesn't pass the Holocaust Test. What greater good could justify the horrors of the Holocaust? This further undermines the claim that God is all-good. Even assuming that the Holocaust serves some divine purpose, that purpose must be evil if the only way to achieve it was through the Holocaust. An end that is only reachable by a means that is unjust is itself unjust.

Does such a general principle mean that the dentist is evil? This indicates a lack of clarity in this discussion. Are suffering, pain, and injustice equivalent? Injustice is irredeemable. An injustice cannot be justified by the outcomes achieved by it. It remains an injustice regardless of the outcome. Pain and suffering, on the other hand, are not like this. A pain can be justified by the outcome: as the dentist analogy shows. Notice how one's evaluation of the dentist changes if he causes more pain than necessary, has no reason for removing the tooth, does little to reduce the pain of his patient, or performs the operation without the consent of the patient. So long as the pain is serving an accepted purpose it is not deemed wrong. The pain becomes a type of injustice when it is forced upon an innocent party or where the goal of the pain is some injustice.

The Holocaust brought about the pain, suffering, and death of millions of innocent individuals. It is not, therefore, analogous to the dentist's drill. It is an injustice of cosmic proportions; and as such, it is deeply offensive or greatly confused to characterize it as an instrumental good to some divine purpose or greater good.

This Theodicy does not resolve the paradox. It moves the question of God's goodness from the current evil to the unknowable divine purpose to which this current evil is supposed to be a means. Since we are not privy to divine purposes or the greater goods the evils are supposed to serve, we are not in a position to judge the merit of these ends or goods. But, that means we are not in a position to judge God's goodness either. Thus the problem of evil remains.

The Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil is, I think, one of the most intriguing issues in the Philosophy of Religion.

One reason is that the problem of evil is something that actually seems to move people in terms of religious belief. I'd be surprised to learn of anyone who was convinced of the existence of God because of the argument from first cause or the argument from design. These arguments, generally, are convincing only to those who already accept the existence of a deity. And I'd be even more surprised to discover a theist who gave up his belief because the arguments for the existence of God were riddled with logical fallacies.

Yet, if you looked around and talked with someone who has either turned to faith or rejected faith, I'd bet you'd find that the Problem of Evil was a contributing factor. The existence of evil in the world appears to be something that actually influences people's belief (or non-belief) about God.

After the Holocaust many Jews, as well as other followers of other religions, gave up on faith. How could God exist and allow such evil? What kind of belief in God could make sense of the senseless murder of 6 million?

Many people reacted similarly to 9/11. How could God allow people to kill so many innocent people...and in his name no less?

And yet for others, their faith is made stronger by these events. They see God's presence in the righteous actions of those who risked their lives to save Jews or in one's own miraculous survival in the Holocaust. And many turned to faith for answers after 9/11.

Many scholars posit, as well, that the existence of evil was the impetus for the birth of religion in the first place. As ancient Man began to think of his place in the universe and reflected on his experience of great pain and suffering, he invented (or turned to, I guess, depending on one's belief). One can see this through out the Bible: God and his prophets reassuring the people that there was a reason for the pain and suffering in the world.

Another reason that the Problem of Evil fascinates is because it raises so many important philosophical questions: free will, moral responsibility, the nature of faith, the role of reason in religious belief, and basic metaphysical questions: is the universe one where God, devils, angels, miracles can exist or is it one where the supernatural is essentially nonsensical.

So, just what is The Problem of Evil?
The standard conception of God in the Western monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) is that God is Omniscient (all-knowing), Omnipotent (all-powerful), and Omni-benevolent (all-good/loving).

God is all good, so he wants to prevent suffering and injustice. He'll have the right motives.

God is all powerful, so he has the means to stop suffering and injustice.

God is all knowing, so he knows when and where suffering is occurring, so he has the opportunity.

In other words, God has the motive, means, and opportunity to prevent suffering and injustice.

And yet, suffering and injustice (evil) persist.

We have four claims:

1. God is all-good


2. God is all-powerful


3. God is all-knowing


4. Evil Exists

These four claims together appear to be incompatible, but (most) theists do not want to deny these four claims. So, in attempts to resolve this paradox, theists often engage in Theodicy. From the Greek for God's Justice, Theodicy is an attempt to show that all four claims are compatible.

There are, as you can imagine, many theodicies. Over the years, I've collected the various ones I've come across, either from research or from students. In a subsequent series of posts, I will explain and analyze some of the more interesting theodicies.

A couple of ground rules and warnings for this series:

• I'm primarily interested in theodicy that maintains all four claims. One might argue, as Rabbi Kushner does in his deservedly famous When Bad Things Happen to Good People, that God is not all-powerful. Such an account makes room for the existence of evil, but it also changes the standard Omni-conception of God that most theists appear to hold.


• I am interested in hearing from others about their thoughts on these Theodicies. Since I'll be dedicating one post to a Theodicy (or a set of closely related ones), keep your comments to a post focused on the theodicy being discussed.


• I will delete any comments that do not actually contribute to the discussion: so don't bother calling me a blasphemer, engaging in witnessing or preaching, or posting a bunch of Biblical quotes about how "He's the one" or some such thing. Remember this is my website, not a community bulletin board.


• In the end, none of the theodicies work. Nonetheless, unlike many non-theists, I do not think this demonstrates the non-existence of God. It does, however, point to the basic irrationality of religious belief. I will elaborate this point in a later post that will conclude this series.