The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism by Douglas B. RasmussenMy rating: 5 of 5 stars
In Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl argued that the liberal order is best defended by grounding it on a neo-Aristotelian perfectionist ethics. In The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics, they defended that perfectionist ethics and its meta-ethical basis. In their latest work, they shift their defense of liberty, natural rights, and the liberal social order to metaphysics and epistemology. In particular, a defense of metaphysical realism, which in basic terms is the view that (1) there are real things that have natures independent of and apart from any cognition of these things; and (2) we are capable of knowing these things and their natures.
The authors argue that natural rights, since they rest on an appeal to human nature, is best grounded in metaphysical realism. And, further, since the individualist perfectionist ethics they defend also rests on an appeal to human nature, human flourishing, and natural goodness, they need to defend the case for metaphysical realism and how it supports those concepts.
As they defend their neo-Aristotelian-Thomistic account of realism, their primary target is Hilary Putnam and what they call neo-pragmatist accounts of ethical and epistemological constructivism which reject aspects of or all of metaphysical realism. They are also targeting other classical liberal and libertarian thinkers who have shied away from or rejected natural rights and natural goodness as the best ground for the liberal order.
The first half of the book is restatement of their arguments for natural rights and natural goodness, with an eye towards why metaphysical realism undergirds these arguments. The second half of the book is a defense of metaphysical realism along with the critique of Putnam and the pragmatist constructivist views.
I’m largely in agreement with Rasmussen and Den Uyl; whatever criticisms or disagreements I might have are largely nitpicks and rhetorical. I certainly see the value of using Putnam as a foil for their own view and the value in showing why those pragmatist, constructivist views fail (especially in terms of engaging with those with hold more to those ideas than Dougs’ views). But at the same time, I personally found those sections of the book the least interesting and engaging. Nevertheless, they are valuable as critiques of popular contemporary views in philosophy.
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